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TORT LAW - UPON REQUEST, JURORS IN A PERSONAL INJURY CASE MUST BE INSTRUCTED THAT THE DAMAGES
AWARDED ARE NOT SUBJECT TO FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAXES. Blanchfield v. Dennis, 292 Md. 319, 438 A.2d 1330
(1982).
After receiving unnecessary chemotherapy treatment, the patient
sued her physician for negligent diagnosis.' At the conclusion of the
trial the judge refused to grant the physician's request to instruct the
jury that any damages awarded to the plaintiff would not be subject to
income taxes. 2 The jury awarded the patient $800,0003 and the physician appealed, contending that the court erred in not giving the requested jury instruction. Maryland's intermediate appellate court held
in favor of the defendant and remanded the case for retrial on the damages issue.4 The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari and
ruled that upon request, jurors in a personal injury case must be instructed that any damages awarded are not subject to federal and state
income taxes.'
The issue of whether a jury should consider the effect of income
taxes, when determining lost income or awarding damages, has been
examined by a substantial number of courts since World War 11.6 Most
courts generally have been reluctant to inject tax considerations into
jury deliberations in personal injury and wrongful death actions.7 The
majority view has its genesis in Hall v. Chicago & North Western Rail1. After noticing a problem with her vision, the patient entered a hospital where her
physician administered tests. After release from the hospital, her physician informed her that she was suffering from terminal multiple myeloma and only had a
short time to live. In an effort to retard the progress of the disease, the physician
initiated chemotherapy treatment, which caused the patient to become so ill that
she had to retire from her job. The physician discontinued the chemotherapy
treatment after one month. Subsequently the patient sought a second medical
opinion from the Sloan-Kettering Memorial Cancer Center in New York. There,
after 20 days of laboratory tests, she was informed that she never had multiple
myeloma and should never have been subjected to chemotherapy. Blanchfield v.
Dennis, 292 Md. 319, 321-22, 438 A.2d 1330, 1331-32 (1982).
2. Federal law provides that gross income does not include "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or
sickness." I.R.C. § 104 (a)(2) (1976). Maryland law states that "[tlhe taxable net
income of an individual taxpayer of this State shall be that taxpayer's federal
adjusted gross income as defined in the laws of the United States." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 81, § 280(a) (1980).
3. The verdict was reduced to $400,000 through remittitur. Blanchfield v. Dennis,
292 Md. 319, 320 n.1, 438 A.2d 1330, 1331 n.1 (1982).
4. Blanchfield v. Dennis, 48 Md. App. 325, 428 A.2d 80 (1981), afl'd, 292 Md. 319,
438 A.2d 1330 (1982).
5. Blanchfield v. Dennis, 292 Md. 319, 438 A.2d 1330 (1982).
6. The recent focus on the propriety of considering income tax in fixing damages in
personal injury or death cases is probably attributable to the high level of income
tax and the increase in damage verdicts occurring since the end of World War II.
Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1395 (1959).
7. E.g., Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555 (1956); Eriksen v. Boyer,
225 N.W.2d 66 (N.D. 1974).
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way Co. ,8 in which the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a jury was
properly instructed to disregard any reference made to the tax exempt
status of a jury award. The Hall court based its holding on three considerations: (1) a tax exempt instruction would have been extraneous; 9
(2) the parties' status in a lawsuit is immaterial because the plaintiffs
disposition of an award is of no concern to the jury;' 0 and (3) this instruction would nullify the congressional intent to bestow a benefit on
the victim. I
By contrast, the minority view is represented by Dempsey v.
Thompson.' 2 In Dempsey, the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded
that most jurors, while aware of the impact of taxes upon income, are
generally ignorant of the laws which exempt taxes from personal injury
and wrongful death awards.' 3 The court reasoned that the average juror might erroneously inflate an award to compensate the victim on the
mistaken belief that the award would be reduced by income taxes. The
Dempsey court therefore concluded that an instruction which correctly
stated the law would help to prevent possible jury misunderstanding.'a
The issue in Blanchfield of whether to instruct the jury that damages for personal injuries are exempt from federal and state income tax
was one of first impression in Maryland.' 5 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, however, had previously ruled in Lumber Terminals
v. Nowakowski' 6 that a jury should not consider evidence of income tax
consequences when fixing damages for loss of past earnings or for impairment of future earning capacity because of personal injuries.' 7 Although Lumber Terminals was confined to this issue, the intermediate
appellate court stated in dictum that "[tjaxes are strictly between the
plaintiff as taxpayer and the government as collector, and are of no
legitimate concern of the defendants. . . . The tax exemption was intended by Congress to benefit the injured party, not the wrongdoer."' 8
8. 5 III. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955). For a complete survey of the states, see Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1398-1416 (1959 & Later Case Service 1976 & Supp.
1983).
9. Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 5 11.2d 135, 152, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955).
10. Id at 151-52, 125 N.E.2d at 86.
11. Id at 152, 125 N.E.2d at 86.
12. 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
13. Id at 346, 251 S.W.2d at 45.
14. Id
15. Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md. App. 325, 337, 428 A.2d 80, 87 (1981), aft'd, 292
Md. 319, 438 A.2d 1330 (1982).
16. 36 Md. App. 82, 373 A.2d 282 (1977). A stevedore was injured when a lumber
carrier ran over his foot. At trial, the employer objected to the trial judge's refusal
to permit expert testimony as to the plaintiff's net wages.
17. Id at 96-97, 373 A.2d at 291. The Lumber Terminals court stated "the award of
damages should be based upon the plaintiff's gross earnings or earnings capacity
and should not be reduced because of any income tax savings which may result to
the plaintiff from the fact that the damages will be exempt from income tax." Id

at 97, 373 A.2d at 291-92.
18. Id at 98, 373 A.2d at 291-92.
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The court of appeals in Blanchfield v. Dennis19 found separate the issues
of the jury instruction concerning the tax exempt status of jury awards
and the propriety of evidence pertaining to tax consequences upon lost
income. Blanchfield thus avoided overruling Lumber Terminals based
on this distinction.20
The Blanchfield court relied heavily on the 1980 United States
Supreme Court case of Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt.2'
The Liepelt Court held that evidence relating to the effect of taxes on
the decedent's past and future earnings was admissible to reduce a Fed22
eral Employer's Liability Act (FELA) award based on those earnings,
and the jury should also be instructed, upon request, that any award
would not be subject to taxation as income.2 3 The portion of the
Liepelt decision concerning admission of tax evidence to estimate
proper damages was not presented to the Blanchfield court. 24 The court
of appeals, though, strictly conformed to the second holding of Liepelt,
reasoning that since the instruction was a plain statement of law, it
would help to prevent a jury from mistakenly inflating an award and
overcompensating a plaintiff.25 The Blanchfield court agreed with the
Liepelt Court's conclusion that the average juror would be under the
false assumption that an award would be subject to taxes and that the
requested instruction would dispel that erroneous belief.26 While acknowledging that it was adopting the minority view, Blanchfield suggested that the majority view might now be overruled because many of
the majority holdings were rendered in FELA actions; since Liepelt
now controlled the disposition of all FELA cases, precedent was sub19. 292 Md. 319, 438 A.2d 1330 (1982).
20. Id at 323 n.5, 438 A.2d at 1332-33 n.5; accord Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67
N.J. 466, 341 A.2d 613 (1975). The Tenore court stated:
The matter of income taxes has concerned the courts in two ways: (1)
should future taxes be deducted from future wages in estimating losses
from deprivation of future earnings; (2) should juries be told the fact that
awards of damages are not subject to income taxes. Different considerations apply to these questions but the courts have frequently dealt with
them together. The first problem is addressed to precision in estimating
loss of future earnings; the second, to the matter of dissuading the jury
from increasing a verdict on the mistaken assumption that the damages
are taxable and a desire to make the plaintiff whole as against such tax
imposition.
Id at 485, 341 A.2d at 623.
21. 444 U.S. 490, reh'g. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980). In Liepell, a fireman employed
by the railroad was killed in a locomotive collision. In the subsequent wrongful
death action, the trial court refused to permit the railroad to introduce evidence
showing what the decedent's net income would have been after taxes and denied
the requested jury instruction that any award would not be subject to income
taxes. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 492.
22. Id at 493-96.
23. Id at 496-98.
24. Blanchfield v. Dennis, 292 Md. 319, 323 n.5, 438 A.2d 1330, 1332-33 n.5 (1982).
25. Id at 324, 438 A.2d at 1333 (citing Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490,
498 (1980)).
26. Blanchfleld, 292 Md. at 324, 438 A.2d at 1333.
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ject to rejection.27 The court of appeals concluded that the effect of the
brief cautionary instruction would not complicate the case, confuse the
jury, or introduce irrelevant matters at trial.28
While the Blanchfield decision is logical and should discourage inflated jury awards in personal injury cases, the court of appeals neglected to address a fundamental concern of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
argued that by exempting damage awards from income taxation in personal injury cases, Congress intended to bestow a benefit upon the injured victim. Consequently, if instructed that any award it gives is tax
free, the jury may erroneously reduce an award and thereby deprive
the victim of the intended congressional benefit. 29 The majority in
Liepelt, though, found nothing in the legislative history or the language
of the applicable federal statute3" to suggest that this tax exclusion was
to impact on the measurement of damages.3 ' in Lumber Terminals, the
court of special appeals had previously rejected a preference for bringing tax considerations before the jury.32 In addition, Lumber Terminals intimated that Congress intended the tax exemption for jury
awards in personal injury cases as a benefit to the injured party.3 3
Therefore, unlike the Supreme Court, Maryland found that Congress
intended such a benefit.
The Liepelt Court permitted the admission of tax evidence to estimate true earnings loss. 34 This position had been specifically rejected
earlier by Lumber Terminals.35 Although the issue of admission of tax
evidence was not presented to the Blanchfield court, the court of appeals did assert that it would recognize the Lumber Terminals decision
and would express no view concerning its propriety.36
The Blanchfield decision does contain attractive logic and common
sense. A jury instruction that damages in a personal injury case are
exempt from federal and state taxation will reduce jury misconception
and confusion when determining the proper amount of damages.3 7 As
27. Id. at 327, 438 A.2d at 1334.
28. Id. at 326, 438 A.2d at 1334.
29. Brief for Appellant at 15-16, Blanchfield v. Dennis, 292 Md. 319, 438 A.2d 1330
(1982).
30. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1976).
31. The majority stated that "we see nothing in the language and are aware of nothing
in the legislative history of [I.R.C.] § 104(a)(2) to suggest that it has any impact
whatsoever on the proper measure of damages in a wrongful-death action." Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 496 n.10 (1980).
32. Lumber Terminals v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 82, 373 A.2d 282 (1977).
33. Id. at 98, 373 A.2d at 292.
34. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493-96 (1980).
35. Lumber Terminals v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 82, 373 A.2d 282 (1977).
36. Blanchfield v. Dennis, 292 Md. 319, 323 n.5, 438 A.2d 1330, 1332 n.5 (1982).
37. See, e.g., id at 321, 438 A.2d at 1332-33, in which the court of appeals approved
the instruction that "any damages awarded to the plaintiff are not income to her
within the meaning of federal and state income tax laws, and no income tax will
be owed or paid thereon." In Liepelt, the Supreme Court permitted the following
instruction: "your award will not be subject to any income taxes, and you should
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such, the court of appeals should not reject Lumber Terminals by expanding Blanchfield Overruling Lumber Terminals would create enormous problems for the court and the jury. For example, juries would
be given the task of calculating complex tax issues, expert tax testimony
would often become necessary, and tax evidence would transform simple tort actions into unnecessarily complicated trials.3 8 Thus, the positive effects of the Blanchfield decision, simplicity and clarity, must be
retained by Maryland courts.
John R. Kaye

not consider such taxes in fixing the amount of your award." Liepelt, 444 U.S. at
492.
One of the main concerns suggested by the patient was that juries, upon hearing the instruction on the tax exempt status of damages in personal injury actions,
might mistakenly reduce the award and thereby negate the tax exemption benefit
to the victim. The instruction set forth below may prevent the loss of this benefit:
I charge you, as a matter of law, that any award to the plaintiff in this
case, if any is made, is not income to the plaintiff within the meaning of
the federal income tax law. Should you find that plaintiff is entitled to
an award of damages, then you are to follow the instructions already
given to you by this Court in measuring those damages, and in no event
should you either add to or subtract from that award on account of federal income taxes.
Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1248-49 (3d Cir.) (emphasis supplied), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971). This instruction seems to emphasize that the tax exemption plays no role in the awarding of damages. See also
Morris, Should Juriesin PersonalInjury Cases Be Instructed That Plaintiffs' Reco veries Are Not Within The Meaning Of FederalTax Law?, 3 DEF. L.J. 3 (1958)
(detailed discussion of the benefits of such jury instructions).
38. Comment, Income Taxation And The Calculation of Tort Damage Awards." The
Ramiflcations of Norfolk & Western Railway v.Liepelt, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
289 (1981).

